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Iflas and Chapter 11:  Classical Islamic Law and
Modern Bankruptcy*
ABED AWAD AND ROBERT E. MICHAEL**
In many majority Muslim countries, classical Islamic law, Shari’a, is by law either a
source or the primary source of their national legislation.1  While the substantive compli-
ance with this Shari’a mandate by these countries is questionable,2 there has been an enor-
* This article examines the Islamic Law of Bankruptcy in Sunni jurisprudence.  There are two primary
denominations in Islam:  Sunni and Shi’i.  The substantial majority of Muslims (87-90%) in the world belong
to the Sunni denomination, of which there are four schools of jurisprudence, as discussed below.  Given the
dominance in the most traditional Muslim communities of one of them, the Hanbali School, this article will
primarily rely on its usages.  While the Islamic Law of Bankruptcy according to Shi’a jurisprudence is very
similar to Sunni jurisprudence, and the four Sunni Schools are also similar, there are differences.  This article
does not address these differences. See generally DEVIN J. STEWART, ISLAMIC LEGAL ORTHODOXY:
TWELVER SHIITE RESPONSES TO THE SUNNI LEGAL SYSTEM 1-25 (2007); see also Haider Ala Hamoudi, You
Say You Want A Revolution: Interpretive Communities and the Origins of Islamic Finance, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 249,
264-267 (2008).
** Abed Awad practices law in the New Jersey-New York area focusing on general civil litigation including
complex matrimonial law, commercial law, Islamic law, and international law.  Mr. Awad has frequently
testified as an expert in Islamic law and the laws of various Arab countries before American courts.  Mr. Awad
is an Adjunct Law Professor at Rutgers Law School and Pace Law School where he teaches Islamic
Jurisprudence.  Robert E. Michael, a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, is the Managing Member of
Robert E. Michael & Associates PLLC, specializing in cross-border corporate insolvencies.  He is the former
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law of the New York City Bar Association, its
current Chairman of the Subcommittee on Islamic Law, and is also an Adjunct Professor at Pace Law School.
1. Saudi Arabia is known to strictly follow Islamic law; the Quran is its Constitution. SAUDI ARABIA
CONST. art. 1.  Ayatollah Khomeini instituted the “Guardianship of the Mullahs” in Iran, making Shi’a Islam
its ultimate source of law.  Peter Edidin, 1979:  Iranian Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2009, at 24.  This
application is not limited, however, to nations where the clergy plays an important political role.  In 1980, the
Egyptian Parliament amended Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution to state that all future legislation must
be based on Islamic law.  Clark Benner Lombardi, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt: The
Constitution of The Sharia in a Modern Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 81, 89  n.27 (1998).  The
2003 Iraqi Constitution includes a provision that Iraqi law must not violate Islamic law. IRAQ CONST. art. 2.
Even where the law generally does not have to conform to Shari’a, various levels of Islamic law and courts are
either mandatory or available to Muslims throughout the world in the area of family law and purely intra-
Muslim disputes.
2. See, e.g., Wael B. Hallaq, Can the Shari’a be Restored?, in ISLAMIC LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
MODERNITY 21, 21-48 (Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., 2004) [hereinafter Can the
Shari’a be Restored?].  “What has remained of the traditional system in the modern codes is no more than a
veneer.  Penal law, land law, commercial law, torts, procedural law, bankruptcy, and much else has been
totally replaced by their European counterparts and supplemented, in due course, by several other codes and
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mous expansion over the past twenty to thirty years of Islamic finance—public and private
financial transactions which purport to be governed by Islamic law.  Islamic finance and
banking have grown from virtual nonexistence to constituting an approximately trillion-
dollar industry worldwide according to current estimates.3
It is therefore not surprising that Islamic finance has been the subject of a great deal of
scholarly attention.  What has not yet received the same level of exegesis is the loss side of
the equation—the laws and rules of Shari’a that apply when something goes wrong.  Is-
lamic debtor-creditor and bankruptcy law is due to come into much sharper focus now
that the tide lifting all ships has stopped rising and, in many areas, is going out.  This
article is intended to provide an exposition and analysis of the basic precepts of this side of
Islamic commercial law and, in doing so, compare them to the basic elements of Western
bankruptcy, notably that of the most successful and emulated one, Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code.45
Above all, this article will discuss what the authors consider to be the five primary con-
cepts that underpin or constitute the foundation of the Islamic law of bankruptcy:  (1) the
prohibition of riba (interest), and the concomitant lack of a theory of the time value of
money; (2) the obligation to be socially responsible; (3) the divine directive to pay all of
one’s debts if you are able to do so, with death being the only source of a final discharge;
(4) the absence of a limited liability or entity shielding concept; and (5) the absence of
concepts of intangible assets and many forms of non-possessory rights common in other
legal systems.  These five concepts are interwoven in the fabric of Islamic commercial and
financial law.
I. What We Mean by “Classical Islamic Law”
Shari’a is more than simply ‘law’ in the prescriptive sense.  It is also a methodology
through which a jurist engages the authoritative religious texts to ascertain divine will or
intent.  The outcome of this process of ascertaining divine will is the positive law.6  In that
sense, Shari’a reaches its purpose as described by the meaning of its name–the Path, or the
Way7–to provide guidance as to the best actions or omissions to comply with the divine
will, which is the only true moral anchor of a Muslim’s existence.  And this principle
regulations, such as the law of corporation, copyright law, patent law, and maritime law.” Id. at 24. See also
Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293 (explaining that, with the
exception of the family law codes, the civil codes, the commercial codes, and the penal codes of most Arab
countries are Western codes, which are to a great extent inconsistent with classical Islamic law).
3. SHAYERAH ILIAS, Cong. Research Serv., RS 22931, ISLAMIC FINANCE:  OVERVIEW AND POLICY CON-
CERNS, 1-2 (Feb. 9, 2009).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (2006).
5. See e.g., Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, (UNCITRAL),
U.N. Doc. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/05-80
722_Ebook.pdf.  The UNCITRAL Guide on Insolvency Law, issued in 2005, is modeled very closely on
Chapter 11.
6. WAEL B. HALLAQ, SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS 84 (2009) (explaining that
under Islamic law, human acts that are “subject to the regulation of Sharia and therefore pronounced as law”
are categorized under five norms: the forbidden, the obligatory, the recommended, the neutral, and the disap-
proved) [hereinafter SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS].
7. KHALED ABOU EL FADL, SPEAKING IN GOD’S NAME:  ISLAMIC LAW, AUTHORITY AND WOMEN 307
(2008).
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applies in all aspects of life—whether it is a commercial transaction, a divorce settlement,
or one’s relationship with parents and children.8
All such juristic inquiries begin with the Quran and the Sunna.9  The Quran is the
Muslim Holy Scripture.10  It is a compilation of revelations—the Word of God—received
by the Prophet Mohammad from the Archangel Gabriel over a twenty-three year period
beginning in 610 A.D.11  The Sunna is essentially the prophetic example embodied in the
sayings and conduct of the Prophet Mohammad, as to what he promoted, what he al-
lowed, and what he prohibited; this was preserved in a narrative form that became known
as a Hadith.12
When an issue arose that was not expressly addressed in the foundational texts, or when
the foundational texts were subject to varying interpretations, a methodology to utilize the
foundational texts and the sanctioned interpretive tools evolved into a sophisticated juris-
prudential system.13  Without an ecclesiastical hierarchy or a Sanhedrin-type court,14
there was no institutional monopoly over divine truth or divine intent by any scholar.
This environment fostered and actually encouraged different interpretations of the law.
This process of acceptance of different interpretations developed into full-fledged Schools
of Law or madhaheb.15  This “legal pluralism,” according to Hallaq, explained Shari’a’s
“flexibility and adaptability to different societies and regions.”16  It is believed that dozens
or even hundreds of different scholars established their own Schools of Law with students
8. SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6. See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 5-31 (2009) [hereinafter INTRODUCTION]; MOHAMMAD HASHIM
KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 1-2 (2003). See also EL FADL, supra note 7.  “Sharia Lit.,
water source, the way, the path; Islamic theology and law: the path or way given by God to human beings, the
path by which human beings search God’s Will.  Commonly misinterpreted as ‘Islamic law,’ Shariah carries a
much broader meaning as the sum total of categorizations of all human actions . . . . Shariah is not restricted
to positive law per se but includes moral and ethical values, and the jurisprudential process, itself.” Id.
9. KAMALI, supra note 8, at 16, 58.
10. Id.
11. Much like the Jewish Torah, of which the Quran declares itself to be the second amendment (the
Christian Bible being the first amendment), the Quran includes approximately 500 verses with legal rele-
vance. WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES 3 (2002) [hereinafter HISTORY].
“Among the multitude of exhortations and prescriptions found in the Quran, there are many legal and quasi-
legal stipulations.  For example, legislation was introduced in select matters of ritual, alms-tax, property and
treatment of orphans, inheritance, usury, consumption of alcohol, marriage, divorce, sexual intercourse, adul-
tery, theft, homicide, and the like.  Muslim jurists and modern scholars are in agreement that the Quran
contains some 500 verses with legal content.” Id.
12. KAMALI, supra note 8, at 58-59; INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 16-18.
13. SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 59-60.
14. Again, this is the Sunni system.  Shi’a Islam is hierarchical and has authoritative rulings by the Imams.
Hussein Abdulwaheed Amin, The Origins of The Sunni/Shia Split in Islam, ISLAM FOR TODAY, http://www.
islamfortoday.com/shia.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2010).  Under Shi’i jurisprudence, there are also the binding
legal rulings and traditions of the Imams, the prophetic successors to Muhammad, of which there were either
twelve (believed by the majority Twelvers), seven or five, depending upon the sect.  In addition, the Shi’i
jurists argue that, unlike the Sunnis, they rely more on reason (aql) to interpret the law. Id. See generally
STEWART, supra note*; see also Hamoudi, supra note*.
15. INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 31-37; see also WAEL B. HALLAQ, THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF
ISLAMIC LAW 150-77 (2005) (explaining how the evolution of the schools from a circle of students with their
teacher to personal schools to doctrinal schools by the 9th century) [hereinafter ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION].
16. INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 27.
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and followers.17  Over time and by the 11th or 12th century, these schools went through a
process of consolidation and/or extinction due to objective political, social, economic, and
intellectual factors which led to only four surviving schools in Sunni law18—Hanafi,
Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali19.
After the two primary sources of Islamic law, the Quran and the Sunna, the two main
secondary sources of Islamic law developed by the madhaheb are:  (1) ijma (consensus of
the ulema, the scholars and jurists, and sometimes the entire community), and (2) qiyas20
(reasoning by analogy to one of the higher sources).21  Other sources of Islamic law such
as istihsan (juristic preference), istishab (presumption of the continuity or permanence in
juristic reasoning), istislah (public interest as a source of law) are tertiary.22  The process of
analytical legal reasoning that is used to deduce or derive the law from the primary sources
is called “ijtihad.” Ijtihad literally means to exert, strive, and/or endeavor.  A jurist would
utilize ijtihad by engaging and exerting his independent intellectual faculties and reasoning
based on the express scriptures and/or spirit of the scriptures to reach a legal or theologi-
cal ruling.23  A key element of the process is that only properly trained jurists were quali-
fied to interpret the sources, and thus determine the law.  Therefore the holder(s) of
political powers were not competent to create law.  In other words, Shari’a “was not the
product of Islamic government” and was to a great extent independent of the ruler.24
Because the Shari’a governs every aspect of an observant Muslim’s life, including com-
mercial and financial dealings, the underpinnings of Islamic finance and commercial trans-
actions and business relationships are also ruled by the same degree of honesty, good faith,
an eye to fairness, social responsibility, and equity as interpersonal relations.  In particular,
the Quran and the Prophet Mohammed were very concerned about protecting the poor in
17. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION, supra note 15. See generally 4 CHRISTOPHER MELCHERT, THE FORMA-
TION OF THE SUNNI SCHOOLS OF LAW, 9TH-10TH CENTURIES C.E. 198-204 (1997).
18. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION, supra note 15, at 167-72. See generally SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE,
TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6 (providing an authoritative history of the development of Islamic law and
jurisprudence).
19. The geographic allocation of these schools is generally as follows:  The Arab Persian Gulf countries
follow the Hanbali School of Law; North Africa, such as Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, follow the Maliki
School of Law; Sunni Muslims in Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Syria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as
Central Asia, tend to follow the Hanafi School of Law.  Palestine and East Africa, Indonesia and Southeast
Asia predominantly follow the Shafi’i School of Law.  As a result of the fact that the majority of Islamic
finance is originating out of the Gulf countries, the authors’ examination of the Islamic law of Bankruptcy
relies on the most authoritative Hanbali treatise on Islamic Law of Bankruptcy. See generally Islam, in ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF POLITICS AND RELIGION 383-93 (Robert Wuthnow ed., 1998) [hereinafter Islam]; HANS VIS-
SER, ISLAMIC FINANCE:  PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 15-16 (2009); ILIAS, supra note 3, at 1.
20. There are some differences between Shii jurisprudence and Sunni jurisprudence.
21. INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 21-27.
22. Id.  See generally KAMALI, supra note 8; HISTORY, supra note 11 (providing a detailed discussion on the
sources of Islamic law).
23. EL FADL, supra note 7, at 301 (“ijtihad Lit. exertion.  The process of exerting one’s utmost in an effort
to deduce laws from sources in unprecedented cases.  Novel or original legal solutions, the effort of a jurist in
searching for and deducing the correct law.”). See also HISTORY, supra note 11, at 117-21.
24. INTRODUCTION, supra note 8, at 35-36.  “Thus, legal authority in Islam . . .  was in the persons of the
individual jurists (be they laymen or, on occasion, caliphs) that authority resided . . . [d]evolving as it did upon
the individual jurists who were active in study circles, legal authority did not reside in the government or
ruler, and this was a prime factor in the rise of the madhhab.  Whereas law—as a legislated system—was often
“state”–based in other imperial and complex civilizations, in Islam the ruling powers had, until the dawn of
modernity, almost nothing to do with the production and promulgation of legal knowledge or law.” Id.
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society from exploitation by the wealthy, especially from moneylenders.25  Moreover, the
Prophet instituted certain regulations intent on acting as market regulation to make sure
that wealth was not concentrated in a small group26 and that necessities in society were
not subject to speculation due to scarcity.27
During the Middle Ages in Western Europe, when Islamic military conquests were no
longer the dynamic driver of Muslim society,28 Muslim jurists expanded and rationalized
Islamic law.29  This full-bodied Shari’a occupied the vacuum resulting from the disappear-
ance of the Roman Empire and its very sophisticated legal system.30  Beginning with the
functional replacement of the Caliphates by the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century and
culminating with the piecemeal European colonial conquests of the majority of the Mus-
lim world and the nation-state building post colonialism that occurred from the 18th
through the late 20th centuries, governance by “Classical Islamic law” was suddenly and
abruptly31 replaced by various national legal systems, increasingly based upon English
common law or French civil law.32 Shari’a remained primarily as the local law limited to
governing family and religious disputes.33
Because “Islamic” finance is purported to be governed by classical Islamic law, this arti-
cle therefore is intended to be part of the effort to determine how classical Islamic law
addressed debtor-creditor law in the Golden Age of Islam to inform how it would apply
today.  The laws and practices we refer to in this article are therefore not those of today’s
Muslim nation-states, but those of the pre-modern Muslim period.
25. S.M. Ghazanfar & Azim Islahi, Explorations in Medieval Arab-Islamic Economic Thought: Some Aspects of
Ibn Qayyim’s Economics, in MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC ECONOMIC THOUGHT 128-41 (S.M. Ghazanfar ed., 2003).
The prohibition of usury is “absolute, as per the scriptures, some argument (aside from ‘sinfulness’) being the
possibility of economic exploitation and injustice in transactions.” Id. at 134.
26. The Divine directive to give charity is:  “So that wealth does not circulate only among your rich.”
Quran 59:8.
27. See ILIAS, supra note 3, at 1; see generally Mohammad Fadel, Ribaˆ, Efficiency And Prudential Regulation:
Preliminary Thoughts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 655 (2008); Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the
Prohibition of Riba in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence (2001), available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/
riba.pdf.
28. The Muslim, or Moorish, armies were stopped in the West in 732 A.D. near Poitiers, in the Southwest
of France (by Charlemagne’s grandfather).  The eastward expansion was equally rapid.  The conquests of the
Arab Muslims by the Seljuk Turks during the 11th and 12th Centuries heralded the beginning of the end of
what is called the Pax Islamica, or the Islamic Golden Age. History of Seljuk Turks, TURKEY FOR YOU, http://
www.turkeyforyou.com/travel_turkey_seljuks (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
29. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION, supra note 15, at 167-72. See generally MELCHERT, supra note 17.
30. ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION, supra note 15, at 167-72.
31. See generally Can the Shari’a be Restored?, supra note 2 (demonstrating that the colonialist project caused
a rupture in Islamic legal thinking and the Islamic legal institution effectively destroying it overnight).  “[T]he
demise of the shari’a was ensured by the strategy of ‘demolish and replace’:  the weakening and final collapse
of educational waqfs, the madrasa, positive Islamic law, and the shari’a court was made collateral, diachroni-
cally correlational, and causally conjoined with the introduction of state finance (or, to put it more accurately,
finance through the controlling agency of the state), Western-style law schools, European codes, and Euro-
pean court system.  If law were to represent the entire spectrum of Islamic culture, it would not be an exag-
geration to state that by the middle of the twentieth century, nothing in Islam was saved from a distinctly
determined and omnipotent European hegemony.” Id. at 24.
32. See id.; see also Hamoudi, supra note *.
33. Id.
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II. The Conceptual Framework of the Islamic Law of Bankruptcy34
The Arabic word iflas means bankruptcy.35  It covers both the modern senses of (i)
balance sheet insolvency, when an entity’s assets are less than its liabilities; and (ii) income
statement or cash flow insolvency, when an entity has insufficient liquid or monetizable
assets to pay its debts as they come due.  The Arabic word muflis means a bankrupt entity,
whether male or female or business enterprise.36  And once one is a muflis, there are only
two ways that status ends:  full repayment of all unforgiven debts or death.
The primary textual authority for the Islamic law of bankruptcy is in the ultimate source
of Shari’a, the Quran, at verse 2:280.  It is commonly translated as:  “If a person is in
difficulties, let there be respite until a time of ease.  And if you give freely [i.e., if you
forgive the debt voluntarily] it would be better for you, if only you knew.”37
As this verse makes clear, at the heart of the Islamic law of bankruptcy are the principles
underlying all of the Shari’a: social responsibility and charity.  This forceful divine, but
not compulsory, recommendation to be kind to one’s debtor, is balanced by the Quranic
verse that compels a Muslim to repay one’s debts—making it a sin and not just a legal
obligation not to pay off all of your debts that you have the capacity to repay:  “O you who
believe, you shall fulfill your covenants.”38
In other words, not just creditors are compelled to exercise honest dealing and scrupu-
lous fairness.  This is a divine instruction to fulfill one’s contracts.  To make this point, the
jurists frequently cite a tradition from the Prophet that stated that a debtor delaying pay-
ing a debt or an obligation without a valid excuse, even to a wealthy person, is unjust.39
Flowing from this, debt is frowned upon in Muslim ethical and moral perceptions.  It is
believed that the Prophet Muhammad had told his believers that the soul of the Muslim
will be suspended with his debts and freed only when his debts are satisfied.40
Contextually, theologically, and philosophically, there is a direct link between the Is-
lamic law of bankruptcy and the Islamic law of finance.  Both are tied to social responsibil-
ity and economic equity.  In fact, the verse in the Quran that outlaws all forms of riba
34. As noted earlier, our exposition of the Islamic law of debtor-creditor and bankruptcy is according to the
Hanbali School.  We primarily rely upon one of the most authoritative Hanbali law treatises from the 12th
Century:  Ibn Qudamah’s al-Mughni.  It is a commentary on a famous 10th century Hanbali treatise titled al-
Mukhtasar, written by a renowned 10th century jurist named Abu al-Qasim Ibn al-Hussien ibn Abdallah al-
Kharqi.  Al-Mughni continues to be regularly consulted until today by Saudi Arabia courts. IBN QUDAMAH,
7 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABU MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH IBN AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD, AL-MUGHNI FI FIQH
IMAM AL SUNNAH AHMAD IBN HANBAL AL SHAYBANI [THE NOME OF THE BIGGEST BOOKS IN (HANBALI)
ISLAMIC SCHOOL] 5-6 (abdallah ibn abd al muhsen al turki and abdel fatah muhammed al-hilu eds., 1988).
35. THE HANS WEHR DICTIONARY OF MODERN ARABIC 850 (JM Cowan ed., 1994).
36. IBN QUDAMAH, 1 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABU MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH IBN AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD,
AL-MUGHNI FI FIQH IMAM AL SUNNAH AHMAD IBN HANBAL AL SHAYBANI 536-37 (abdallah ibn abd al muh-
sen al turki and abdel fatah muhammed al-hilu eds., 1988); see also Abdassamad Clarke, Fulus, World Islamic
Mint, Aug. 22, 2010, http://www.islamicmint.com/news_articles/articles/fulus.html.
37. Quran 2:280. All translations of the Quran are from Tarif Khalidi’s recent translation:  The Quran
(Penguin Classics, 2008).  Unless otherwise noted, all other translations from Arabic to English here are by
Abed Awad.
38. Quran 5:1.
39. Fath al-Baari Sharh Saheeh Bukhari, Traditions, http://www.al-eman.com/hadeeth/viewchp.asp?BID=
12&CID=217.
40. The Basic Rules of Islamic Funerals, Islamic Center of Raleigh, http://islam1.org/iar/imam/archives/2004/
12/30/the_basic_rules_of_islamic_funerals.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
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(discussed below) follows immediately the verses that require Muslims to be charitable.41
The two concepts are then blended together: “Those who consume usury (riba) shall not
rise from the dead . . . [t]his is because they allege that commerce is the same as usury
(riba).  But God has made commerce licit and usury illicit . . . . God annuls usury and
augments free gifts.”42  The very next paragraph includes the verse quoted above that
establishes the jurisprudential predicate for Islamic bankruptcy law.43  Thus, both lending
and repaying are interwoven with powerful divine compulsions to be charitable and com-
passionate.  Additionally, both are dynamically impacted by the static concept of money as
a means of exchange and storage of value—a commodity that facilitates commerce, rather
than something of intrinsic value such as capital.44  The first element is the consistent
requirement for fair treatment and avoidance of punishment for an inability to pay one’s
debts due to economic hardship.
The second element is manifested, and also will be discussed below, in the fact that
there is no equivalent to discharge of debts under Islamic law.  This harsh rule, at first
seemingly inconsistent with a charitable imperative, is the natural extension of the fact
that Muslims are directed to fulfill their obligations and promises.
It is also consistent with the lack of interest on money or increase of the amount of a
debt due to delayed payment.  Without the debt increasing over time, the debtor has a
lifetime to whittle it down.  With no risk value of money creating high interest rates to
reflect the inability of the insolvent debtor to repay the debt on time, the amount of the
debt can only go down over time, both in real and economic terms.  Put another way, if
you can pay it back at any time in your life, you must.  But if you cannot, there is no moral
or legal requirement or penalty.  In sum, a debt owed to someone must be paid if possible.
Muslims must fulfill their promises and obligations both to God and to man.
These key tenets of no discharge and social responsibility are prescriptive elements of
Islamic law that clearly differentiate it from Western law.  In addition, there are three
basic elements of Post-Enlightenment Western law that underlie all modern capitalist sys-
tems that are not a part of the current mainstream Shari’a, creating critical differences:  (i)
the time and risk value of money, as discussed above, (ii) entity-shielding, and (iii) intangi-
ble and non-possessory assets and rights.45
41. Quran 2:275.
42. Quran 2:276.
43. The supremacy of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and the exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy of fed-
eral courts in the United States are based on a similar thin reed.  It is all based solely on Article 1, Section 8,
Clause 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of
bankruptcies throughout the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
44. S.M. Ghazanfar & A. Azim Islahi, Economic Thought of an Arab Scholastic:  Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, in
MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC ECONOMIC THOUGHT 23-44 (S.M. Ghazanfar, ed. 2003) (quoting al-Ghazali–a re-
nowned 12th century jurist).  “When someone is trading in dirhams and dinars themselves, he is making them
as his goal, which is contrary to their functions.  Money is not created to earn money, and doing so is a
transgression.  The two kinds of money are means to acquire other things; they are not meant for themselves
. . . .  If a person is permitted to sell (or exchange), money with money (for gain), then such transactions will
become his goal, and thus money will be imprisoned and hoarded. Imprisonment of the ruler or postman is a
transgression, for then they are prevented from performing their functions; same with money.” Id. at 37. See
also Robert E. Michael, Address to the Ambassadorial Level Meeting of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference in the United Nations, Islamic Finance in Relation to Capitalism and Socialism (Apr. 6, 2010), availa-
ble at http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=4ec3e621-e2c1-4ab0-a2a2-798112b92801.
45. Michael, supra note 44.
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“The time value of money is the opportunity value of having control over, and use of,
the money for the period involved . . . .”46  Its common measure is the inflation rate.  The
risk value of money is more complex, having two components—the risk of it not being
paid back and the risk of it not being paid for reasons having nothing to do with the
purpose for which it was provided.47  Classical Islamic law certainly contemplated and
approved of the former, assuming risk profit or loss in return for one’s investment of
value.  It did not have the latter—the risk of not being repaid for other reasons.  This is
the direct result of the fact that in Islamic law, money is viewed solely as either a commod-
ity itself or as a universal unit of exchange.48  This has sweeping consequences for Islamic
debtor-creditor law.49
The purest expression of this distinction is in the current mainstream Muslim position
that interprets the Quranic riba to include a complete prohibition of the charging or pay-
ing of interest.  The root of the word riba literally means, “increase.”50  “Without interest,
a debt of $1,000 incurred today must only be repaid with $1,000 in the future, with no
accounting for any value to the use of the funds in between.”51  Strictly speaking, it is
prohibited to take a loan and pay it back with interest.52
We recognize that an intense debate has developed in Islamic scholarly and financial
circles over the meaning of riba.  Certainly, mainstream Orthodox Muslims today agree
that all forms of conventional “interest” are the same as the forbidden riba.  Disputes with
this today are based on a variety of theories beyond the scope of this article but generally
focus on conflating interest with inflation of value over time and that riba only applied to
certain commodities, and/or riba is usury note interest.53  We are deconstructing interest
to limit it to the application of asset appreciation to money as a means for storage of value
itself and as a unit of exchange.  This article does not refer to money as a commodity or as
a replacement for or price of the tangible asset into which it may have been exchanged.
With this understanding, there is no time value of money in the Western understanding of
capital.
Thus Shari’a accords no value to the ability to utilize the money in the meantime.  In
other words, it is considered unlawful riba—unethical and sinful—to either lend or bor-
row a sum certain (“X”) today, for example $1,000 dollars, to be paid back in one year at a
greater sum (“X+Y”), say $1,100 dollars.  On the other hand, when money isn’t involved,
there is a concept of “time value” to tangible assets recognized in Islamic law that is iden-
tical to that of Western capitalism’s inflation and asset appreciation.  For example, it is
perfectly acceptable for an owner of a building to sell it to a buyer either for $1,000 dollars
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ghazanfar & Islahi, supra note 44, at 36-37.
49. Id.
50. Among pre-Islamic legal systems of the region, Jewish law prohibited the charging of interest by a
Jewish lender to a Jewish borrower; while Roman law regulated interest, setting rates above which it became
usury. Compare  Islamic Bank, ISLAMIC ECONOMICS, available at http://islamic-world.net/economics/ib_intro.
htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2010) (prohibiting usury), with Ismail Aminuddin, Historical View on Usury (“riba”),
ISLAMIC BANKING WAY Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.islamicbankingway.com/2009/11/6-historical-view-on-
usury-riba.html (allowing usury).
51. Michael, supra note 44.
52. See generally Fadel, supra note 27; Ghazanfar & Islahi, supra note 44, at 36-37.
53. Fadel, supra note 27.
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cash at closing or $1,100 over 12 months54—recognizing both the increase in value of the
house and the service provided by the seller to allow the buyer to have more time to pay
him.55
This explains how the prohibition of riba did not completely block capital formation or
cripple commerce in societies governed by Shari’a.56  Thus, when we assert the lack of
“time value of money” in the Shari’a, we are strictly referring to the lack of an allocation
of an increase (the root meaning of riba) in value of money as a means to store value itself.
This is perfectly consistent with the fact that under Orthodox Islamic law, precious metals
as a commodity are allowed to increase in value, whether in the form of currency, jewelry,
or ingots.57  While this apparent “lack” restricts capital formation by hampering low-risk
(i.e., non-equity level) investment, it is critical to harmonizing the obligation to repay
one’s debts and a charitable bankruptcy system.  It is the perfect bridge between the two.
While the charging of interest on money is affirmatively rejected by leading Islamic
commentators, entity-shielding,58 which has its most familiar forms in the so-called cor-
54. Michael, supra note 44.
55. See Abraham Udovitch, Credit as a Means of Investment, 87 J. OF THE AM. ORIENTAL SOC’Y 260, 262
(quoting Sarakhsi–a Hanafi authority that “a thing is sold on credit for a larger sum than it would be sold for
in cash”).
56. Id. “The difference in price between a credit and cash sale also helps explain why the prohibition
against usury, to the extent that it was observed (which was probably considerable), did not exercise any
crippling restriction on the conduct of commerce.  For, while the difference in the price for which one sells
on credit and the price for which one sells for cash does not formally or legally constitute interest, it does
fulfill, from the point of view of its economic function, the same role as interest by providing a return to the
creditor for the risks involved in the transaction, and compensating him for the absence of his capital.” Id.
57. For the mainstream current view that interest is riba see Yousef al-Qardawi, Fatwa, http://www.
qaradawi.net/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=377&version=1&template_id=8&parent_id=12 (hold-
ing that “The interest that the depositor receives from the bank is unlawful riba. Riba is every conditioned
increase on principal; that is, what is taken without trade or work, as an increase on the principal, is riba.”).
For the position that Islamic law permits fixed interest–as long as it is not usurious–and it does not constitute
the prohibited riba in the Quran, see Rafic Yunus Al-Masri, Are All Forms of Interest Prohibited?, 17 J. OF KING
ABDELAZIZ U. ON ISLAMIC ECON., 37, 37-42 (2004) (“When a Muslim extends an interest-free loan (qard
hasan), Allah rewards him for such deed.  Had he not foregone the ‘interest rate’, he would have not been
eligible for such a divine reward.  A clearer case is that of a Muslim selling a commodity on credit, he can
obtain a higher price for the commodity sold on credit than its immediate cash price.  Thus there is interest
involved in return for the factor of time or deferment, which is permissible, and which is also the exact
definition of interest.  [. . .]  It is on these grounds that jurists mentioned that time has a share in the price or;
in other words, it is permissible to increase the price (of an article of trade) in return for postponement of the
time of payment, which means that there is a share in the price for the time factor.”). Id.
58. The concept of the corporate veil and limited liability entities, which evolved first with the societas
publicanorum in Rome around the 4th century B.C., disappeared when Rome fell.  It was not until the Geno-
vese proto-stock companies developed around the 15th century, and the Dutch and English stock companies
were created in the early 17th century that the true limited liability entity concept re-emerged in the West.
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm 25-26 (N.Y. Univ. Stern
Sch. of Bus. Working Paper, 2005), available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/eco/wkpapers/Hansmann.pdf.
Full-blown entity shielding really did not develop, however, until the latter half of 19th century in Britain and
the early 20th century in the United States.  There is a very interesting bridge and cross-over between the
commenda joint venture contractual relationship of the Lex Mercatoria and the possibly pre-Islamic, and cer-
tainly fully Islamic mudaraba partnership to which many attribute its origin.  Both originally involved an
investor with liability limited to his investment and a voyager/trader/merchant who was exposed to personal
liability for incurring debts exceeding the enterprise’s assets.  Lost in time, however, is whether the limited
liability aspect of the investor was based on a recognized legal rule or simple practicality. See generally Ron
Harris, The Institutional Dynamics of Early Modern Eurasian Trade:  The Commenda and the Corporation (Tel Aviv
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porate veil and all forms of limited liability partnerships and companies, simply has never
been a part of the Shari’a.59  Consequently, the corporate form never developed in Islamic
law, nor did other more modern vehicles such as limited liability partnerships or compa-
nies.  All personal and economic activities are conducted through either direct proprietary
ownership or one of the “nominate” forms of partnerships that were approved by the
jurists.
In some ways, this is both similar to and associated with the lack of such personal prop-
erty rights that are common in other economic systems, such as intellectual property
rights and the equity of redemption, or such key accounting concepts as goodwill and
deferred income and expenses.  As a result, or at least for the same reason, classical Islamic
law also did not develop the concept of non-possessory liens and security interests.  Pos-
sessory liens of personalty are the only ones recognized in the ordinary course; real prop-
erty rights are limited as well.60  The critical exception is a specific right based on an
explicit Hadith to seek recovery of a vendor’s goods that were delivered to a debtor on
credit and not paid for, as discussed below.
The almost exclusive focus on things that one could touch and see is not surprising
given the temporal framework of the development of classical Islamic law with its adver-
sity to uncertainty and speculation.  As with so many other areas, Roman law had in fact
developed many of these concepts, but they were not resuscitated until nearly 1,000 years
after Rome fell.  In many ways, classical Islamic law was far ahead of the West.  For exam-
ple, the Shari’a recognizes the usufruct of real property and leaseholds (Ijara) and allowed
common ownership through a partnership.61  Joint tenancies of real estate without the
four unities (i.e., owned by individuals without completely the same interests) were not a
feature of English common law until after the 15th century.62
With these basics in the background of any analysis involving Islamic commercial law,
we can turn to the treatment of defaulting debtors.
Univ. Working Paper, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1294095 (dis-
cussing both the commenda and its relationship to the mudaraba partnership).
59. See generally ABRAHAM L. UDOVITCH, PARTNERSHIP AND PROFIT IN MEDIEVAL ISLAM (1970).  “In
Hanafi law, and indeed in all of Islamic law, the liability in all partnerships is unlimited.  In all Islamic part-
nerships, the partners are liable in proportion to their share of the total investment.  There is no limit whatso-
ever on the amount of the partnership’s liability.  Each partner is responsible for his share of the partnership’s
indebtedness regardless of what it amounts to, or by how much it exceeds the value of his own share of the
company’s assets.” Id. at 41.  However, as noted above and discussed below, the mudaraba partnership argua-
bly does function as a form of limited partnership.
60. Mark J. Sundahl, Iraq, Secured Transaction, and the Promise of Islamic Law, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1301, 1312-33 (2007) (providing the Islamic law traditional view that possession is required in pledges but
arguing that such requirement is not expressly supported in the Quran).
61. See, e.g., MANSOUR B. YUNUS B. IDRIS BUHUTI, AL-RAWD AL-MURBI BI-SHARH ZAD AL-MUSTAQNI
319 (2002) [hereinafter AL-RAWD].  “Partnership . . . is of two types.  [The first type is] Partnership in Own-
ership, which is where [more than one person] join in a right, such as proof of ownership in real estate or a
benefit for two or more persons.” Id.  This form of partnership is akin to the common law concept of joint
ownership in real estate without the right of survivorship. Id.
62. See, e.g., Etoll v. Etoll (In re Etoll), No. 08-23238 (Bankr. D. N.J., Mar. 5, 2010), available at http://www.
leagle.com/unsecure/page.htm?shortname=inbco20100305642.
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III. The Debtors
Muslim jurists defined a person to be a muflis as one whose debts exceed his assets and/
or a person whose current expenditures exceed his current revenues.63  As noted above,
Islamic debtor-creditor law made no distinction between balance sheet insolvency (assets
minus liabilities) and liquidity insolvency (insufficient cash flow).64  This is a natural con-
sequence of the basic elements noted, which included the absence in Shari’a of either the
time value of money or most intangible assets, since tangible assets could be presumed to
be readily able to be liquidated.  Thus, because the debtor’s assets could be utilized to pay
off his debts, there was no need to distinguish between asset shortfalls and cash flow
shortfalls.  A debtor becomes a muflis when the debtor defaults and the creditor or credi-
tors move to collect.
Women under Islamic law have full legal capacity to contract, own property, earn in-
come, and inherit.65  Therefore, women can also become bankrupt.  As such, laws apply
identically to women as to men.  In addition, this rule also applies to businesses.  There is
no distinction between a business bankruptcy and an individual bankruptcy.  As noted
above, limited liability companies or corporations with limited liability did not develop
under Islamic law.66  Therefore, most business relationships throughout Islamic history
(other than straightforward vendor-customer merchant ones) were different types of part-
nerships and joint ventures.
IV. Personal Bankruptcy versus Commercial Bankruptcy
As noted above, there is no distinction in classical Islamic bankruptcy law between per-
sonal and commercial bankruptcies.  This is entirely consistent with the related elements
of a continuing duty to pay one’s debts and the lack of the development of limited liability,
entity-shielded, business vehicles, such as the corporation.  As a result, the liabilities of the
business enterprise would also be the obligations of the individual owner, or the partners
in the partnership.
63. IBN QUDAMAH, 1 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABU MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH IBN AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD,
AL-MUGHNI FI FIQH IMAM AL SUNNAH AHMAD IBN HANBAL AL SHAYBANI 536-38 (abdallah ibn abd al muh-
sen al turki and abdel fatah muhammed al-hilu eds., 1988); Clarke, supra note 36.
64. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36; ABD AL AWAL ABDIN MUHAMMAD BASYUNI, ATHAR AL-IFLAS FI ISTIFA
AL-DAININ HUQUQAHUM MIN AL-TAFLISAH: DIRASAH MUQARANAH FI AL-FIQH AL-ISLAMI WA-AL-QANUM
AL-WAD’I [THE EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY TO SATISFY THE CREDITORS’ RIGHTS OF THE BANKRUPTCY:  A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE AND POSITIVE LAW] 32, 35, 39 (2008).
65. See generally Azizah Yahia al-Hibri, Muslim Women’s Rights In The Global Village:  Challenges and Opportu-
nities, 15 J. L. & RELIGION 37, 46-47 (2001).  “[T]he Muslim woman is an independent legal entity, not lost
through marriage.  A Muslim woman retains her own name after marriage.  She also retains her financial
independence.  She can own property in her own right whether she is married or single, and no one, not even
her husband, may access her funds or properties, or demand any form of financial support from her.  Any
money or property of her own that the wife gives her husband, even if she is richer than he, is regarded as a
loan unless she expressly specifies otherwise.” Id. See generally YOSSEF RAPAPORT, MARRIAGE, MONEY AND
DIVORCE IN MEDIEVAL ISLAMIC SOCIETY (2007).
66. The closest thing to an artificial legal entity that Islamic law developed was the waqf, an endowment or
trust that operated only for charities or businesses.
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There are several types of partnership structures under Islamic law.67  The inan partner-
ship is one of the most common: it is a limited investment vehicle—limited in duration or
project.  In it, only the amount a partner contributes to the partnership becomes part of
the partnership’s property.  His other assets are not part of the partnership.68  Although
the partners are each other’s agent to the extent of the partnership’s assets and purpose,
they are not each other’s guarantors.69  The partners in an inan partnership are severally,
not jointly, liable to third parties.70  This means that the third party must seek payment of
his entire claim directly from the partner with whom he dealt.  After the partner has paid
the third party claim, the paying partner would be entitled to seek the appropriate contri-
bution from the other partner.  In sum, within the partnership, they are jointly liable for
all liabilities arising out of the partnership enterprise.71
None of the partners have the right to take on any debt that would exceed the partner-
ship’s agreed assets.  If they do, the partner that did not authorize the additional credit is
not liable for anything in excess of his original agreed upon earmarked contribution to the
partnership fund—either to the other partners or to the third party creditor.72
If none of the partners have willfully undertaken such an excess obligation or debt, but
for unforeseen circumstances (such as a casualty loss) the partnership becomes liable for a
debt in excess of its assets, all of the partners will be liable to make up the deficiency
according to their ownership interest.  As between each other and the inan itself, their
liability will be limited to their proportionate interest in the partnership as per the con-
tract or verbal agreement of the partners.73  Although the partners can agree to distribute
profits disproportionate to their original investment, they are not permitted to allocate the
liabilities disproportionately.74
A mufawada partnership is an agency partnership—the members of the agency contract
are each other’s agents and guarantors.75  All partners should be equal in capital invest-
ment and profit sharing.  They are liable jointly and severally for any obligations to third
parties not repaid by the mufawada assets.76  In the event that such several liability causes a
partner to make a payment in excess of his personal investment in the mufawada assets, the
partner would then have a right to seek reimbursement (“contribution”) from the other
partners for the amount they paid to the third party creditor(s) in excess of their invest-
ment percentage.77  The exception to this joint and several liability is that partners are not
liable for the criminal acts, wrongful appropriation of another’s property, and purely per-
67. AL-RAWD, supra note 61.  For a good introduction regarding the differences, see generally IBN RUSHD,
BIDAYAT AL MUJTAHID WA NIHAYAT AL MUQTASID [THE DISTINGUISHED JURIST’S PRIMER] 301 (Imran
Ahsan Khan Nyazee trans., 1996) (2000).
68. See MANSOUR B. YUNUS B. IDRIS BUHUTI, 6 KASHAF AL QINA AN MATN AL-IQNA 534-35 (1999)
[hereinafter KASHAF]; UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 41.
69. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 319-20; see also KASHAF, supra note 68, at 533-35; UDOVITCH, supra note
59, at 119, 135.
70. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 320.
71. Id. at 319-320; KASHAF, supra note 68, at 533-35; see also UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 135.
72. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 320; UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 135.
73. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 320, 322; see also KASHAF, supra note 68, at 533-35; UDOVITCH, supra note
59, at 135.
74. KASHAF, supra note 68, at 532-33.
75. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 322; KASHAF, supra note 68, at 564; UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 99-100.
76. KASHAF, supra note 68, at 564; UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 100, 109.
77. KASHAF, supra note 68, at 564; see also UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 99.
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sonal, non-partnership obligations of a partner like marriage and divorce obligations, and
purely personal guarantees for third parties.78
The Mudaraba partnership, in which one (and now, potentially many) partner(s) provide
only money and the other(s) provide material and “sweat equity,” is without question the
most important Islamic vehicle for modern Shari’a-compliant finance.  As noted above, it
both similar to and presumed to be the origin of the commenda contract that was the
cornerstone of long distance trade as Europe emerged from the Dark Ages.79  While orig-
inally the mudaraba (also called “qirad”), like the commenda, was designed to finance cara-
vans and maritime trade,80 there is no such actual restriction in the Shari’a.  As a result,
the mudaraba partnership form has become nearly the essential building block of modern
Islamic financial investment vehicles.  This is because the structure is designed to limit the
liability of the “investor” to the amount invested.
In a classic mudaraba, a mudarib, or manager, takes money from the rabb al-mal, the
investor, under a contract that provides for a sharing of the profits between them from the
work performed exclusively by the mudarib (and his employees, etc.).  The sharing per-
centage is set for in the contract.81
What distinguishes the mudaraba from a Western limited partnership is that the inves-
tor technically retains ownership of the capital he has contributed.82  This creates a unique
construct under Shari’a because asset possession is controlled by someone who is not a
buyer (title would pass), a lessee (there is no time period, only a purpose), or an agent
(since the mudarib does not bind his principal, the rabb al-mal, for any deficiency but only
binds his contributed assets).  Nevertheless, because all actual assets of the partnership
come from the rabb al-mal, in a mudaraba setting, the liability for loss falls entirely on the
investor(s).  But if the manager exceeds his authority, he may be personally liable.  The
general rule is that a manager in the mudaraba setting may buy on credit up to the agreed
capital for the venture.  He has to stop when accounts payable are equal to the capital
employed.  If he makes further purchases on credit, he needs special permission.  Other-
wise, he may be personally liable.83
All partnerships under Islamic law terminate at the will of any partner, death of a part-
ner, insanity of a partner, or the destruction of the capital of the partnership.84  Addition-
ally, a mufawada partnership terminates if there becomes an inequality in interest among
the partners in the partnership, presumably through one making a payment of debts
greater than another or the receipt of property eligible to be part of the partnership capital
via gift or inheritance that creates an imbalance in the partnership capital.85
As noted above, when distraint on a debtor takes place, he is treated as one who is a
minor, insane, or incapacitated.  He is prohibited from managing and disposing any of his
assets, including assets that he has in a partnership.86  Thus, the distraint may well likely
78. UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 169.
79. See Harris, supra note 58, at 14-15.
80. Id. at 16-18.
81. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 320; KASHAF, supra note 68, at 542-44.
82. UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 170.
83. AL-RAWD, supra note 61, at 321; KASHAF, supra note 68, at 556-57.
84. UDOVITCH, supra note 59, at 117-18.
85. Id. at 118.
86. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 537.
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have the effect of terminating or dissolving the partnership.  In sum, the insolvency of one
partner could jeopardize the entire partnership venture.
As a result, all of the provisions that we will discuss below that apply to individual
bankruptcies also apply to bankruptcies involving partnerships.  In other words, the per-
sonal assets of the partners are fair game to the creditors to satisfy their debts.  However,
the Shari’a does have its own version of the famous, or infamous, common law Jingle Rule
of partnership liability.87  While, as discussed below, there are no preferences for a part-
nership’s business creditors to take precedence over personal creditors of a bankrupt part-
ner, there is a requirement, somewhat similar to the common law equitable principle of
marshaling of assets, that the partnership’s assets be exhausted before a partnership credi-
tor can assert a deficiency claim against the individual partners.88
V. The Proceeding
A bankruptcy proceeding is commenced by the creditors.89  One or more creditors will
request from a judge, with jurisdiction over the location of the debtor, to issue an order to
encumber or distrain the debtor.90
The burden is on the creditors to show proof of the debt and that the debt had become
due.  If the judge finds that he has enough assets to pay off his debts, the judge will order
payment without distraining91 debtor.  The judge could also decide that it is necessary to
87. The Jingle Rule gives partnership creditors priority over partnership assets as against creditors of the
partners, and vice versa.  It was formally codified in the Uniform Partnership Act, 1914, adopted in New York
in 1919.  It is still the law of New York.  New York Partnership Law §71 provides, in pertinent part:
(h) When partnership property and the individual properties of the partners are in the posses-
sion of a court for distribution, partnership creditors shall have priority on partnership property
and separate creditors on individual property, saving the rights of lien or secured creditors as
heretofore.
(i) Where a partner has become bankrupt or his estate is insolvent the claims against his sepa-
rate property shall rank in the following order:
I. Those owing to separate creditors,
II. Those owing to partnership creditors,
III. Those owing to partners by way of contribution.
N.Y. P’ship Law § 71 (McKinney 2010).
88. Islamic law is similar to the approach adopted in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.  While in general, the
Bankruptcy Code expressly treats all unsecured creditors the same according to the “absolute priority rule” of
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b), 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) provides:
(a) If there is a deficiency of property of the estate to pay in full all claims which are allowed in a case under this
chapter concerning a partnership and with respect to which a general partner of the partnership is personally
liable, the trustee shall have a claim against such general partner to the extent that under applicable nonban-
kruptcy law such general partner is personally liable for such deficiency.
11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
89. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 570.  Since there is no divine compulsion to pay one’s debts under
Western law, the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to commence cases voluntarily, almost without limit. See
11 U.S.C. § 301.  Three creditors with non-contingent and undisputed unsecured claims adding up to the
statutory amount (now $13,475) can commence an involuntary case.  § 303(b)(1).  If there are fewer than
twelve such holders, only then can a single such creditor with a claim of that amount commence an involun-
tary case.  § 303(b)(2).
90. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 570.
91. The equivalent under the Bankruptcy Code is the “order for relief” issued by a bankruptcy judge in an
involuntary bankruptcy case.  11 U.S.C. § 303(h).
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distrain the debtor while reviewing whether the debtor is solvent or insolvent.92  This has
the effect of freezing the debtor’s assets until further order by the court, which appear to
be similar to an order of distraint in the common law (the “Distraint Order”).93  The
issuance of the Distraint Order acts as an immediate preliminary injunction prohibiting
the debtor from managing, disposing, or encumbering his or her assets.
Four legal consequences arise from the Distraint Order:  (1) the creditor’s rights attach
to the debtor’s property; (2) the debtor is prohibited from disposing of or managing his
property; (3) the creditor that finds his specific actual property is more entitled than the
rest of the creditors for its return; and (4) the debtor’s property is liquidated to satisfy the
creditors’ debts.94
The legal authority for the Distraint Order is that the creditor’s rights are attached to
his property.95  A distrained person is treated like a minor, insane, or incapacitated per-
son.96  The court will appoint a trustworthy person (rajul thiqah) [hereinafter Receiver] to
manage the assets and business affairs of the bankruptcy in order to wind down the affairs
of the debtor, gather and value the assets, and then liquidate the assets for distribution of
the proceeds to the creditors.97  This is similar to virtually all of the Western civil and
common law systems.98  It is also similar to the Bankruptcy Code procedure in Chapter 7,
Liquidation, in which a trustee-in-bankruptcy is required to take possession of the
debtor’s assets.99  By contrast, it is the exact opposite of the process under Chapter 11.100
Under Chapter 11, the debtor is allowed to stay in control of his assets as the debtor-in-
possession, although he is now imbued with all the legal rights of a trustee-in-bank-
ruptcy.101  This is possible under the common law system because of the creation of a new
“estate” in the form of a trust that acquires ownership of all of the debtor’s pre-bankruptcy
assets.102
The debtor’s debts that are not due at the time of the Distraint Order will not be accel-
erated.103  The Hanbali position provides that only debts that are past due are included in
92. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 537-38, 569-70.
93. A Distraint Order is the opposite of the automatic stay created by 11 U.S.C. § 362, and the similar
suspension des poursuites and equivalents under other national laws that block.  § 362.  The concept of the
distraint was first seen in Roman law.  “A lex julia, attributed to Caesar by some, and to Augustus by others,
removed the creditor’s power one step further from the debtor as an individual and towards his property.
The new legal system was called cessio bonorum . . . .  The main objective of the execution, i.e. distraint, was no
longer the debtor as a person and his body, but his property.”  Karl Gratzer, Insolvent, Thus a Swindler?  The
Insolvency Law And Imprisonment for Debt in Sweden, XIV INT’L ECON. HISTORY CONG., 45th Cong. 3-4
(2006).
94. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 537.
95. Id. at 537; KAMALI, supra note 8, at 47 (2008).
96. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 571.
97. Id. at 577; BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 242-43.
98. MAHMOUD A. EL-GAMAL, ISLAMIC FINANCE: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PRACTICE 15 (2007).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 701 (2010).
100. Id. § 1104.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 541.  It is important to remember that Islamic law, exactly like traditional Western civil law, did
not develop the concept of the trust (except for the charitable waqf).  So, there is no artificial entity that can
own the debtor’s assets like the bankrupt estate under section 541 of the U.S. Code.  Therefore, the function
of the Distraint is in the form of injunctive relief for the creditors.
103. This is also the opposite of the bankruptcy statutes under U.S.C.  All contingent debts, obligations, and
causes of action are converted into claims, under section 101(5), and may be estimated under section 502(c).
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the proceeding.104  Debts that are not due are not accelerated.105  The argument by the
Hanbali School is that the debtor is entitled to the additional time to satisfy the debt when
it is due per contract.106  It is not due at this point, therefore, it should not be included in
the bankruptcy proceeding.107
The liquidation takes place in an auction-like setting in an attempt to realize the highest
price.108  The judge appoints a trustworthy man (rajul thiqah), who appears to be similar to
a receiver and who would be responsible for fulfilling open contracts, canceling open con-
tracts, and generally operating a business of the debtor, so long as the creditors agree.109
Of course, the receiver’s actions are subject to the creditor and the judge.110  As such, the
Shari’a receiver is very similar in powers and duties to his homologues in all Western
systems, except Chapter 11, such as the administrators under British insolvency law.111
VI. The Creditors
The debtor’s estate includes all assets and any third-party claims due to the debtor,
including damages from a negligence claim.112  All creditors, subject to class priorities, are
treated equally.113  A creditor is defined as anyone who is entitled to a matured claim or
right from the debtor.114
A. SETTLEMENTS AND COMPROMISES
The creditors and debtor have the option to settle the debt.  In that case, they would
withdraw their request for the distraint of the debtor.115  Therefore, the debtor and the
creditors have the opportunity to enter into negotiations to settle their respective claims.
Of course, the settlement resolves the dispute and ends the litigation.  Settlement is
strongly encouraged under Islamic law as of matter of public policy.116
Islamic laws created two types of settlements.117  The first type is a settlement where
the debtor denies the claim.118  This is a situation where a person claims a right against
the debtor, but does not have a legally cognizable proof of the claim or right.119  The
However, in one semi-Islamic element, claims for unmatured interest are prohibited—but only for unsecured
creditors of insolvent debtors. See id. §§ 101(5), 502(b)(2), 502(c), 506(b), 726(a)(5).
104. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 566-67; KAMALI, supra note 8, at 149.
105. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at  566-67.
106. Id. at 564, 566.
107. Id. See also Sina Ali Muscati, Late Payment in Islamic Finance, 6 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 47, 54
(2007).
108. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 577-78.
109. 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (2010).
110. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 577-78.
111. Bankruptcy (Scot.) Act, 1993, c. 6, § 1.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2010).
113. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 538.
114. SHARI’A:  THEORY, PRACTICE, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 6, at 260.
115. KAMALI, supra note 8, at 47.
116. The word “settlement” (sulh) is described as good in the Quran. See generally BASYUNI, supra note 64,
at 207-09.
117. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 5; BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 211-13.
118. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 5; BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 211-13.
119. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at  6-7; KAMALI, supra note 8, at 82.
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settlement is based on compromise to avoid litigation.120  Some Muslim schools rejected
this type of settlement.121  Some accepted it, but conditioned it upon the requirement that
the defendant truly believe he does not owe the claim.122  If he believes he owes a claim,
the money he saved is unlawful and considered an unlawful taking from a person fraudu-
lently and falsely.123  The schools that rejected this type of a settlement said it is not legal
because it is a compromise or an exchange of a right based on an unproven claim.124
Thus, it is not valid.  Again, this highlights the directive to fulfill your obligations in your
contract.125
The second type is a settlement with the debtor based on what common lawyers call an
admission against interest.126  A creditor claims a right and the debtor admits that he owes
the creditor the claim.127  The creditor, as a compromise, accepts less money to settle the
claim immediately.128  Many schools of law argued that such settlements are unjust and
constitute an unlawful taking of a person’s rightful claim, especially in light of the debtor’s
acknowledgment that he owes the debt.129  This is more an issue of form over substance.
The jurists took a position that if the creditor compromised his right voluntarily (i.e., gave
the reduction as a gift) the settlement was valid.130  Thus, they argue that it should not be
called a settlement but rather a gift.131
B. CLASSES AND PRIORITIES OF CREDITORS
Under the Islamic law of bankruptcy, the creditors are primarily classified in order of
priority as follows:
1. The Receiver
Unless the receiver agrees to perform his services for free, the first priority to be paid
from the liquidation of the debtor’s assets remaining after the recoveries, referred to be-
low by reclamation creditors, are the fees, expenses, and compensation of the receiver to
manage the bankruptcy proceeding.132  These customarily include, but are not limited to,
120. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 7; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 124 (8th ed. 2004).
121. IBN QUDAMAH, 3 MUWAFFAQ AL-DIN ABU MUHAMMAD ABD ALLAH IBN AHMAD IBN MUHAMMAD,
AL-MUGHNI FI FIQH IMAM AL SUNNAH AHMAD IBN HANBAL AL SHAYBANI 312 (abdallah ibn abd al muhsen al
turki and abdel fatah muhammed al-hilu eds., 1988); IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 6; BASYUNI supra note
64, at 312.
122. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 6. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 211-13.
123. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 7; KAMALI, supra note 8, at 82.
124. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 7; KAMALI, supra note 8, at 82.
125. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 149 (2002).
126. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 5; BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 213-15.
127. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 34, at 5; BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 213-15.
128. Symposium, Islamic Finance: Resilience in a Time of Financial Crisis?, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & IS-
LAMIC L. 159, 168 (2009).
129. IBN QUDUAMAH, supra note 34, at 5-7. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 212.
130. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 212; see also KAMALI, supra note 8, at 47.
131. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 212; see also KAMALI, supra note 8, at 149.
132. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 577 (explaining that the trustworthy person selected by the consent of
the parties or order of the court either perform service for a fee, receive payment from liquidation or received
payment from the government treasury (abyt al mal)); see also KAMALI, supra note 8, at 149.
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transportation expenses, notices to the public, and reasonable expenses incurred by the
receiver in operating the business, if necessary, as well as any necessary or reasonable
expenses incurred by the receiver in enforcing or complying with contracts entered into
by the debtor and/or those entered into by the receiver to operate the business, subject to
the approval of the creditor(s) and the court.133
2. Reclamation Creditors
The second priority is for a creditor who is able to discover that his property is in the
possession of the debtor.  That creditor is entitled to demand return of his property as
satisfaction of the debt or has the option to share with the creditors.134  As noted above,
this is based on a Prophetic Sunna where it is believed the Prophet had said that if you find
your property with the debtor, you are more entitled to take it back.135  The Muslim
jurists developed a very complex and nuanced set of elements to be satisfied before a
creditor/seller could take back his property from the debtor.136  The seller is entitled to
return or take back his property if he satisfies five elements:137
i. The debtor must be alive at the time a creditor seeks the return of his property.  If
debtor dies before the creditor secured the return of his property, the creditor loses his
right to seek the return of his property.138  As such, all creditors then join together to
share proportionate to their respective debts after liquidation of the debtor’s property.139
ii. The property must also remain in the same state, undestroyed or undamaged, that it
was when creditor sold it to the debtor.  Therefore, where the creditor discovers his un-
damaged property in the possession and control of the debtor, he will be offered the op-
tion to take back his property as satisfaction for the debt or choose to share with the other
creditors in proportion to his debt from the liquidation.140
iii. The creditor’s property must continue to be in the possession and control of the
debtor.  If the property in question was delivered to the buyer/debtor and the debtor sold
it, gifted it, pledged it,141 or no longer has the item in his possession, the creditor joins the
other creditors in proportion to his debt from the liquidation.142
133. 11 U.S.C. §§ 327-30, 326, 503(b) (2010) (similarly gives these types of expenses of both a Trustee-in-
Bankruptcy and the Debtor-in-Possession priority over unsecured creditors, plus adds for Trustees a percent-
age of all assets distributed to both secured and unsecured creditors).
134. See generally IBN QUDAMA, supra note 36, at 538.  The much weaker equivalent under U.S.C. is the
reclamation right of a vendor who delivered goods to a debtor within forty-five days before the commence-
ment of the bankruptcy, under section 546(c). See 11 U.S.C. § 546 (2006).
135. ABU ABD ALLAH MUH?AMMAD IBN ISMAIL AL-BUKHARI, SAHIH AL-BUKHARI, JAM’IYAT AL-MAKNAZ
AL-ISLA¯MI¯ (2000), Tradition Number 2166, vol. 3, book 41, no. 587 (according to the relevant Hadith, the
Prophet Mohamed said:  “If a person finds his specific property in the possession of a person who has become
bankrupt, he/she is more entitled to it [than other creditors].”).
136. See IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 543-90.
137. Id. at 543-90.
138. Id. at 589.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 543-49.
141. See infra Section 4 (analyzing secured creditors).
142. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 544, 562-64.  If the pledged property is in excess of the secured debt,
the pledge property is sold with the excess returned to the debtor. Id. at 562.
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iv. If the debtor had paid the creditor any installment or down payment, the creditor is
not entitled to take back his property.  The other schools, however, provide the creditor
with the option to either pay back to the Receiver the amount he received and take back
his property as a satisfaction of the debt or share proportionately to his debts with the rest
of the creditors.143
v. The Muslim jurist created laws to govern if the property that was in the possession of
the debtor increased or changed or was converted somehow.144  If the property had in-
creased or been transformed in a way that is directly linked to the actual property such as
growth or aging, return is not available.145  If the property’s increase or transformation is
not directly linked to the actual property such as birth, harvest, and income, return is
available as the increase if the entitlement of the debtor.146  For example, a debtor bought
land from a creditor.  He did not pay for the land.  The debtor cultivated the land or built
a home on the land before he became a muflis.  The creditor then has three options:
(a) The creditor and the bankrupt person can agree to remove the improvement and
return the land to the seller.  The debtor is responsible for the damage to the land from
removal of the improvement.147
(b) If the debtor and the creditor agree not to remove the improvement, the creditor
simply gets to keep it along with the returned land.  As far as planted crops are concerned,
the creditor would take the land back with the planted crops, keep it until the harvest, and
then pay the bankrupt person for the value of the harvest net of any reasonable costs
incurred by the creditor in completing the cultivation, harvest, and sale of the crops.
(c) If the parties cannot agree, the parties will set up a forced option formula like a buy-
sell agreement.  The creditor gives the debtor the option to accept or reject his offer, to
leave the planted crops on his property, or to allow the creditor to harvest the crops, sell
the harvest, and give the proceeds to the debtor, net of any reasonable costs incurred by
the creditor in completing the cultivation and harvest and sale of the crops.  The debtor
also can provide the creditor with an option to accept or reject the debtor’s offer to keep
the improvement on the land until the harvest and then sell harvest.148
The three preceding options apply when there is a clear differentiation between the
original asset and the debtor’s addition (e.g., comparing (1) land to crops or (2) land to a
building built on it).  But, when the debtor’s addition is not so easy to distinguish from the
original asset, different rules apply.149  If the inability to identify the seller’s specific goods
is (a) due to its having become part of a homogeneous larger quantity (most commonly
because the debtor/buyer has bought a fungible commodity—such as oils or grains—from
the seller and commingled it with that of others or the debtor’s own) and (b) the creditor’s
goods and the others with which it was commingled are all of the same quality, the credi-
tor is not entitled to the return of the property because the specific item no longer ex-
143. Id. at 561.
144. See id. at 549-60.
145. Id. at 545-49.
146. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 550-51.
147. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.:  LANDLORD & TENANT § 12.2 (1977) (tenant rights
and obligations as to changes in the physical condition of the leased property).
148. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 557-60.
149. See id. at 545-46.
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ists.150  Several other schools allow the unpaid seller to unilaterally annul his contract and
take back the weight of his oil or grain, even if it is not clearly the goods he sold.151  The
minority school would argue that this outcome is not acceptable because the specific item
no longer exists.152
But if the item is not of the same quality, then the seller has no right of return, and he
shares with the creditors pari passu, meaning they each have equal right to payments.  Sim-
ilarly, if the seller’s goods have been commingled with goods of a higher quality, there is
no right of return, and seller shares with the creditors pari passu.153
Additionally, if the sold goods or items have been changed in a transformative way—for
example, thread that is made to cloth, cloth is made into a garment, grain is milled into
flour or wood made into a door—the right of recovery also does not exist; the seller
becomes a creditor, and he shares with the rest of his class pari passu.154  On the other
hand, if the conversion of the sold good is a change or improvement that is not transform-
ative, such as cloth that was dyed, the Hanbalis say no right of return while several other
schools allow the seller to recover the finished item because it is still the same category of
good, but the seller must account for the cost of the work done by the debtor or the
change in value that resulted from it.155
3. Lessors
Landlords have somewhat similar preferential rights.156  As noted above, the primary
intangible asset recognized by Shari’a is the Ijara, a lease, whether of real estate or of
personalty such as livestock.  If a bankrupt lessee-debtor leases an animal or property, the
lessor has the right to annul the contract and take back his property if the lease date did
not commence.157  If the lease period expired, the lessor is a creditor for the unpaid
rent.158  But if the lease period has commenced but has not expired, the lessor cannot
annul it.  In that case, actual property rights are owned by the lessee-debtor.  The usufruct
remains an asset of the bankrupt, while the lessor is a creditor for the unpaid rent.159
A similar priority for the usufruct is recognized when the landlord becomes bankrupt.
In that circumstance, the Receiver remains subject to the terms and conditions of the
150. Id. at 545.
151. Id. at 545-46.
152. Id. at 545.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 546-48.
155. Id. at 547.
156. This position is adopted by the Maliki School of Law. See generally BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 260-61;
The Bankruptcy Code provisions dealing with real and personal leases are both varied and highly complex.
Primarily included in § 365 along with those for “executory contracts,” those contracts for which is perform-
ance is still due on both sides of the contract, there are a host of highly specialized provisions that deal with
such things as changes in the tenant mix of a shopping center.  11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(A)-(D) (2006).  The
main focus involves whether the debtor’s estate wants to continue the lease, abandon it or assign it for value
to a third party.  § 365(a), (f).  In addition, real property landlord’s damage claims are limited to the future
rent for a specified amount or period between one to three years of rent.  11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2006).  In
addition, there are even more complex provisions dealing with such things as aircraft leases and ship charter
parties.  11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006).
157. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 541-42.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 541.
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contract with the lessee.  In other words, the lessee’s contract will not be annulled or
rescinded due to the landlord’s bankruptcy because the use and benefit of the property is
first in line, like a possessory pledge.160  Of course, the income from the lease will revert to
the Receiver and the Court.
4. Secured Creditor
Creditors with a secured interest get first priority against the collateral.161  As discussed
above, classical Islamic law did not recognize most forms of intangible assets and rights
other than the ownership right of a lessor.162  By virtue of this recognition of the ability to
sever ownership rights from possessory rights, classical Islamic law also developed the
ability of the owner of real property to enter into a written contract that created a residual
right of ownership until the debt is repaid.163  This transaction, called a Murabaha, is a
deferred sale or cost-plus transaction.164  To illustrate: A wants to purchase a home but
needs financing.  B has the financing.  A and B enter into a cost-plus agreement in which
B buys the house then resells it to A in installments, which would include a reasonable
profit.  A has use and possession of the house until full payment is made to B, at which
time B transfers ownership to A.
Besides a murabaha (and an ijara), the only other vehicle for creating a security interest
under classical Islamic law was an actual possessory pledge (rahn).165  A creditor with
pledged collateral to secure a debt has the right to seek repayment from the collateral.  Of
course, given the imperative to repay one’s debts in full, if the sold or pledged item is not
sufficient to pay the creditor’s debt, the creditor will join the rest of the creditors for the
balance remaining—in proportion to other creditors.166
5. Personal Exemptions
Classical Islamic law protects the debtor’s reasonable (prevailing custom) living ex-
penses and family’s support from all creditors and the Receiver but not those assets that
are subject to the claims of a secured creditor.  They must be paid before anyone else.167
160. Id. at 571.
161. Id. at 562, 578.
162. Sundahl, supra note 60. See also Silvia Beltrametti, The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights Under Is-
lamic Law, DIGITAL ISLAM, http://www.digitalislam.eu/article.do?articleId=2729 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
163. Abdul Awwal Sarker, Islamic Business Contract, Agency Problem and the Theory of the Islamic Firm, 1 INT. J.
OF ISLAMIC FIN. SERV’S 17, available at http://eco.isu.ac.ir/edu/dlc/2rd/02/instructor/art2.pdf.
164. Press release, Bank of London And The Middle East Acts as One of The Lead Arrangers For Murabaha
Financing Deal in Turkey, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.blme.com/pdfs/news/BLME%20Murabaha%
20deal%20TFKB.pdf.
165. Definition of Major Islamic Finance Instruments, ISLAMIC FINANCE TRAINING, http://www.islamicfinance
training.com/glossary.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
166. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 562; see Sundahl, supra note 60.
167. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, 574-575.  This was also similar to the Jewish Torah. See generally Exodus
22:25-26 (Torah) (“If you take your neighbor’s garment as security, until sunset you shall return it to him, for
it is his only covering; it is his garment for his skin.  With what shall he lie?  And it shall be [that] if he cries
out to Me, I will hear because I am gracious”).  11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006) (The Bankruptcy Code
contains an intricate set of personal exemptions (§ 522) that are also subject to separate State law exemptions,
in particular with respect to personal residences).
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This includes clothing, shelter, food for the wife, children, and parents.168  Interestingly,
several schools of law held that the creditors and the court must leave sufficient capital for
the debtor to be able to continue his business or trade.169  The tools of the debtor’s trade
are also exempt from the creditors.170  Additionally, if the debtor owns a home, the home
is also exempt from liquidation,171 subject in all cases to the rights under an ijara or
murabaha.
While the Hanbali school provides that a debtor, if able to work, must work to pay off
his debts, other school of law take the position that if the debtor has an income, he cannot
be forced to work to pay off his debts.  However, if he does work his income primarily will
be utilized to support his family, food, shelter, and clothing.172  Whatever, if anything,
remains will go to the creditors.173
6. Other Priorities
Classical Islamic law also recognized specific preferences and priorities for certain un-
secured creditors.  For example, if the owner of a farm is in bankruptcy, the farm’s work-
ers get priority to receive compensation for their wages from the sale of the harvest.174
Similarly, also reflecting the concept of possessory pledges, if the muflis delivered an item
to an artisan to fix or contracted for an identifiable item to be made, the artisan receives
priority for his fee, and he can hold the item until he is paid.175  The creditors have the
option of paying him his fee and taking the item to be included in the debtor’s estate.176
Otherwise, the artisan-creditor has the right to sell the finished goods and has first prior-
ity on the proceeds.177  The same is true for a carrier of goods, who has similar priority
rights with respect to goods in his custody, but this is only so long as he has not released
the goods to the debtor or a third party.178
168. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 574-76.
169. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 241.
170. Deuteronomy 24:6 (Torah) (“One shall not take the lower or the upper millstone as security [for a loan],
because he is taking a life as security.”). See also 11 U.S.C.A. § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2004).
171. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 576-77.
172. Id. at 580-82. See also 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 541, 1115 (West 2004) (demonstrating that this is an area where
there is dramatic difference between a Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code and Chapter 11, as
in Chapter 7, all of a debtor’s income from the moment after the commencement of the case is free from all
of the claims of the pre-existing (or “prepetition”) creditors, but under Chapter 11, since the business enter-
prise is intended to be rehabilitated, all of its “postpetition” income remains part of the bankruptcy estate
usable to reorganize the debtor).
173. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 580-82; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 726 (a)(6) (West 2004) (indicating  that
the final distribution under Chapter 7 is identical).
174. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 262; see also 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 503(b), 507(a)(4) (including a long list of priori-
ties and limited amounts for prepetition wage claims).
175. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 548-49; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 429 (3d pocket ed. 2006)
(demonstrating a similarity to statutory and common law workmen’s and mechanics’ liens under western
systems).
176. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 548-49.
177. Id.
178. BASYUNI, supra note 64, at 88-90, 262-63.
THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
IFLAS & CHAPTER 11 997
7. All other creditors
All other creditors are considered regular creditors that do not have any priority.  They
all share equally proportionate to their debts.179  Given that there is no final discharge and
the debtor is responsible indefinitely to pay off his debts, there is no “bar date” or other
barrier against creditors sharing in the debtor’s assets that may be remain, even if they had
not known the debtor was previously distrained.
C. CREDITOR ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
To enforce their valid rights, the creditors of a debtor, muflis or not, have three primary
tools:  1) request the imprisonment of the muflis until he pays his debt,180 2) follow the
debtor around in his business and in his daily routine to find any assets that can be liqui-
dated,181 and 3) prohibit his travel.182
1. Imprisonment
Imprisoning, or enslaving debtors was a factor of debtor-creditor law as far back as we
have records.  The Code of Hammurabi (c. 1795-1750 B.C.) provided for both, and for
the debtor’s entire family (Laws 115 and 117),183 but also provided for a finite term not to
exceed four years.184  And both Australia and the American colony of Georgia were used
by the British as penal colonies.185  It is therefore not surprising that classical Islamic law
included imprisonment for non-paying debtors.  Given the lack of a possibility of a dis-
charge of one’s debts, the Shari’a did not incorporate a fixed term, like Babylonian186 or
Jewish187 law.  But Islamic law did follow and amplify an element that first appeared in the
Code of Hammurabi188 and then later Roman law:189 the socially responsible, and argua-
bly charitable, distinction between debtors who are victims of some form of force majeure
and those who are reasonably at fault for their defaults.  Classical Islamic law went further.
Under the Shari’a, if the debtor can simply demonstrate or prove that he has no money or
salable assets or he is not able to pay, he will not be imprisoned.190  This effectively, for all
179. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 589.
180. Id. at 585-89.
181. Id. at 589-90.
182. Id. at 591-92.
183. The Code of  Hammurabi 115, 117.
184. Hammurabi 117.  The Jewish Torah had a longer term before discharge, six years, but did not provide
for inclusion of the family members.  Deuteronomy 15:1-3, 12.
185. JIHYEON PARK, THE HISTORY OF PENAL COLONIES (July 2008), available at http://www.zum.de/whk-
mla/sp/0809/pjh/pjh1.html.
186. Hammurabi 117.
187. Deuteronomy 15:1-2.
188. Hammurabi 48, 103.
189. Gratzer, supra note 93 (“The main objective of the execution, i.e. distraint, was no longer the debtor as
a person and his body, but his property . . . In order to prevent . . . abuse, this exemption was restricted to
those cases where the debtor was found not to have caused his insolvency.  Only those who could show that
they had become bankrupt due to external circumstances (such as fire, shipwreck, attacks from robbers, etc.)
were exempt from disgraceful treatment.  In those cases where the debtor himself was considered to have
caused his insolvency, cessio bonorum still meant infamy and severe treatment.”).
190. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 585-90.
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intents and purposes, eliminated debtor prisons. The jurists intimated that what is the
benefit of imprisoning someone who does not have any money.191 This is exactly consis-
tent with the Quranic command: “If a person is in difficulties, let there be respite until a
time of ease.”192
A muflis may be imprisoned for a short period of time to determine the credibility and
veracity of his claim of an inability to pay his debts.193  If the court determines that he
does in fact have money or salable assets and just refuses to pay his debts, he can be
imprisoned until he makes full payment of his debts.194  On the other hand, if it is un-
known whether he has the ability to pay, he is jailed until the judge determines the truth
of his insolvency.195  Ultimately, if it is found that he is insolvent, he will be released.196
Some madhaheb have taken exception with this argument, saying that incarcerating a per-
son is a punishment for a wrong and that incarcerating a person is a serious, extraordinary
measure that should not be utilized unless and until there is substantial proof that he has
the ability to pay and willfully refuses to pay.197  The duration of the sentence is within the
discretion of the judge.198
2. Monitoring and Putting Pressure on the Muflis
Reflecting the more benign approach of Shari’a to debtors, as required by Verse 2:280,
public opprobrium and surveillance replaces much more draconian practices, such as those
mandated in the early Roman Law of the Twelve Tables.199  Islamic creditors instead were
allowed to follow a non-paying debtor around to see if they can catch him with any prop-
erty.200  They are also authorized to publically announce that the debtor owes him a debt
and is not a trustworthy person.201
3. Travel restrictions
If requested by a creditor that the bankrupt debtor be restricted in his travel outside the
town or city so that he is not able to dissipate or hide assets, the court will consider the
surrounding circumstances to determine whether an order restricting the travel should be
issued.  The court would assess whether a pledge of assets as surety, or another mecha-
191. Id. at 585.
192. Id. at 585-87.
193. Id. at 585.
194. Id. at 585-86.
195. Id. at 585.
196. Id. at 585-87.
197. Id. at 588.
198. These are the same criminal procedural safeguards in Islamic criminal law that prevent incarceration
when there is suspicion or the proofs do not rise to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
199. See The Twelve Tables: Table III.1–Debt, June 10, 2009, available at http://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/12
tables.html.  “When a debt has been acknowledged or a judgment has been pronounced in court, 30 days
must be the legitimate grace period.  Thereafter, arrest of the debtor may be made by the laying on of hands.
Bring him into court.  If he does not satisfy the judgment (or no one in court offers himself as surety on his
behalf) the creditor may take the debtor with him.  He may bind him either in stocks or fetters, with a weight
of no less than 15 lbs. (or more if he desires.)” Id.
200. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 588; 18 U.S.C § 152 (2010).
201. IBN QUDAMAH, supra note 36, at 588-89.
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nism, is necessary to insure the debtor’s return.202  In general, the debtor can request
permission to travel based on reasonable grounds such as health, pilgrimage, family obli-
gations, etc.203
Based on the other debt-related sanctions under the Shari’a, it is fair to conclude that if
the court determines that the muflis does not have the ability to pay the debt(s) in ques-
tion, the travel restriction ceases.204
VII. Conclusion
As we discussed above, the classical Islamic law of bankruptcy was quite developed.  The
legislators in many participating countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
will undoubtedly want to rely on this rich body of Islamic jurisprudence to inform and
inspire the reevaluation of their current bankruptcy laws in light of the recent economic
meltdown and the deficiencies in their existing national bankruptcy laws.  Of course, the
objective economic, social, and political circumstances of the twenty-first century are dif-
ferent than those prior to the fourteenth century.  Nevertheless, there is abundant room
for internal evolution and reform that is adaptable to the present conditions from within
the rich Islamic jurisprudential heritage.
Above all, the treatment of a muflis under classical Islamic law is strongly analogous to
the traditional civil and common law treatment of bankrupts prior to the enactment of
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 1978.  Prior to Chapter 11, bankruptcy laws
had as their primary, if not sole, function a fair and equitable distribution of the debtor’s
assets among his or her creditors.  The revolutionary change of Chapter 11 was to make
the paramount purpose of the insolvency proceeding the rehabilitation of the business
enterprise.  As non-Islamic law used the mechanism of the discharge to avoid punishing
debtors and letting them lead a debt-free life, the Shari’a kept the debt from increasing
over time while imposing moral suasion to reach settlements and forgive unsustainable
debts.
To develop a Shari’a-compliant version of Chapter 11, Muslim nations must first accept,
as did the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, that the economic
continuation and revival of ongoing business enterprise is more important, as a public
policy matter, than the maximum short term satisfaction of the business’s debts.  As we
have shown above, strictly speaking the simple Chapter 11 solution of a debt discharge
through a Plan of Reorganization is not permitted, because a Muslim is obligated to repay
his or her debts.  However, under the Islamic concept of settlement (sulh) a creditor could
accept a compromise or reduction of the debt.  The moral theory for such reduction is
that creditor would make a donation or charitable forgiveness of the remaining balance.
Developing a plan of reorganization has substantial authority in Islamic law with the
Quranic directive to extend the time the debtor has to pay and to freely forgive.  This
concept needs to be developed further.  The question is whether the reorganization plan
that would include an across-the-board reduction of the creditors’ debts involuntarily
would pass the requirement to fulfill one’s obligations.  In other words, this concept could
202. Id. at 591.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 591-92.
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replicate many of the elements of a consensual Plan of Reorganization under 11 U.S.C.
§1129(a); although not the “cramdown” Plans provided for in §1129(b).
***
There is no question that the orderly development of Islamic finance will require find-
ing ways to amalgamate the classical Islamic law of bankruptcy with the needs of the
modern Islamic finance industry.  The unreasonable reliance on ever-expanding opportu-
nities has disappeared along with the global credit markets.  It is therefore inescapable that
loss scenarios must be dealt with.  That in turn means effective bankruptcy laws.  We hope
this article will help foster the effort.
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